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Biography and Action:  
A Schutzian Perspective to Life-world
Hermílio Santos
Starting with the discussion on free-will and action, this paper discusses how Alfred Schutz approaches 
these issues for the comprehension of life-world. After a brief overview on how contemporary philosophers 
as Ernst Tugendhat and Ulrich Pothast face these problem, it is argued that for Schutz action plays a 
central role in his conception of life-world. The article goes further and advocates for the importance of 
exploring individual biographies as a way to provide an accurate understanding of actions. By the end of 
this text, it is suggested that the biographical narrative approach, as proposed by Fritz Schütze, as well 
as by Gabriele Rosenthal, is an important contribution to the Schutz’ perspective of the life-world and 
to adequately explore the most different social phenomena.
Contemporary thinkers devoted their attention to the problem of action, in 
which the question on how free individuals are to make choices plays a central 
role. Although still remaining a disputed issue, the sociology of Alfred Schutz 
discusses mainly the genesis of action as a central matter for the comprehen-
sion of social phenomena. The aim of this article is to focus on how Schutz 
deals with this subject, arguing that understanding individuals’ biography is 
seen by the Austrian sociologist as the most adequate way to approach it. It 
should also be emphasized how sociologists have been tried recently to go 
further and make the Schutzian perspective feasible for empirical research 
approaching the comprehension of individuals’ action.  
On free-will and action
Even though considered as a classical issue, some contemporary philo-
sophers have dedicated themselves to the discussion of free-will. Ernst Tu-
gendhat (1992), for instance, conceived this problem as intimately related 
to the meaning of imputability (Zurechnungsfähigkeit), that is best understood 
through the elucidation of the spheres of praxis: the moral sphere, the sphere 
of the penal law and the sphere of the practical reflection in general. 
In the moral sphere it can be seen a deep disagreement between Tugendhat 
and the Kantian school, since for Tugendhat the moral exigency implies im-
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putability, given the fact that if we act immorally, we could have also acted 
morally. 
The question of imputability is also relevant for the penal law, made prob-
lematic through the expression “he/she could have acted differently”. The 
establishment of a punishment is dependent on the understanding of this ex-
pression – in the case that the punishment is legitimate at all. Anthony Kenny 
(1978) lists four meanings for the use of the verb “to can” that appear in this 
sentence. One of these meanings indicates the presence of the capacity as well 
as the opportunity. It is precisely this meaning of “can” that is discussed here, 
that is to say, when free-will implies the capacity of acting in another way. In 
this sense, to be able to do X freely, one has to have the capacity as well as the 
opportunity of not doing X. Kenny defines this meaning of “can” as the start-
ing point to establish the imputability or not of someone facing his/her own 
act. However, it would not be fair to consider someone responsible for his/her 
own acts if he/she lacked the relevant freedom, in this case, i.e., the possibility 
to act differently. 
Ulrich Pothast (1987) argues about the conditions to talk about “guilt”, 
especially if someone has decided to do the “wrong thing”, although he/she 
could have decided for the “right thing”. In conclusion, Pothast idea is not 
only different, but it also opposes the argument presented by Kenny, which 
is already anticipated in the title of his book Die Unzulänglichkeit der Freiheits-
beweise (The insufficient demonstrations of liberty). It seems that for Pothast, the 
expression “he/she could have done differently” doesn’t make any sense. He 
suggests as an alternative “punishment” for criminal acts, to substitute the 
penalty by a therapeutic treatment or the introduction of the mechanism of 
a “social quarantine”. The most positive side of this kind of “punishment” is 
that the criminal will be treated as a “friend” or “guest”, since he/she will not 
stay isolated for a very long time, and during this period there will be always 
someone talking to the intern and willing to restore a trust relationship. 
A question that arises here is how not to recognise the imputability and 
at the same time to admit any kind of punishment, even a therapeutic treat-
ment? Assuming the definition of Tugendhat for imputability (understood 
as the responsibility of someone for an event) or the definition proposed by 
Kenny for the term “responsibility” (to be subject of a punishment), it can be 
asserted that it is inappropriate to think that Pothast tends to deny the possi-
bility of imputability, even if he wants to. His attempt is a contradiction, since 
that to deny the imputability would imply in not admitting even the possibil-
ity that someone could be object of a forced therapeutic process because of a 
criminal act. Therefore, the disagreement between Pothast and Kenny and 
between Pothast and Tugendhat is not very concerned with the existence or 
not of imputability, but on how to deal with those that violate laws. 
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There is another sphere, in which the concept of imputability is not di-
rectly concerned: the practical reflection in general. What is relevant here is 
the possibility to act freely. As proposed by Aristotle, two conditions should be 
considered when establishing limits for acting freely in a determined situation: 
a) that we know what we are doing and b) that we do not act under coercion. 
But Aristotle was referring just to the external coercion. Things become more 
complex if one introduces the phenomenon of internal coercion. In this case it 
is also referred as a compulsory action, when there are obstacles to the exten-
sion of the autonomy, i.e., for the extension of the possibility of thinking and 
to make effective the result of the thought. For some sociologists, the idea of an 
internal coercion explains the limits for an action without visible restrictions. 
Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu represent two schools of socio-
logical thought that seems to postulate the idea of an internal coercion. In 
his structuralist perspective, Giddens (2003) conceive the structure not as 
been external to the individuals, but as mnemic traces made visible in social 
practices. In this sense, individuals incorporate restrictions “imposed” by 
others. Operating this way, individuals anticipate the limits for their ac-
tion, restricting the possibility of talking about freedom of action. Because 
of this internalization process individuals are rarely aware of the restric-
tions they face in everyday life. Giddens (1993) asserts that individuals are 
in some way compelled to choose and define the lifestyle that synthesize 
their place in the world; here lifestyle implies a whole range of practices, not 
only because such practices fulfil utilitarian necessities, but because it gives 
material forms to a particular narrative of self-identity. However, based in 
his structuration theory, this definition is only apparently dependent on in-
dividuals’ own criteria. 
Another influent sociologist postulated the idea of a social process which 
result is the creation of a kind of internal limitation not only to the free ac-
tion, but also to the free-will, considered here as a necessary and preliminary 
moment of the action without restriction. The concept of habitus, as employed 
by Bourdieu (1980), i.e. a system of socially constituted dispositions that gen-
erates and unifies the whole of practices and ideologies of an agent, defines 
the agents’ practices in a regular and constant manner (Crossley 2001: 83). 
Bourdieu states that habitus makes possible the production of all thoughts, of 
all perceptions and also of all actions; in this sense, it seems to enormously 
restrict the possibility of individuals’ interpretation of their own habitus. Ex-
ploring concrete possibilities of internal coercion, Bourdieu presents the idea 
of a symbolic violence, in which the masculine domination is just an example. 
According to Bourdieu (1999), the subordination of women in contemporary 
societies is so deeply sedimented that it doesn’t need to be made explicit with 
the use of more visible instruments of domination, as the physical or psycho-
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logical violence. Through the consent of the dominated person, the masculine 
domination is exercised without the conscience of that. 
In opposition to those philosophers and sociologists that could be consid-
ered affiliated to a “soft determinism” (Kenny 1978), Alfred Schutz seems 
to solve this problem assuming that individuals, distinct to the objects of 
the natural sciences, have the faculty to interpret the world and to interpret 
themselves in the world. The interpretive work of individuals implies, in the 
Schutzian sociology, having at their disposal a system of relevance and typifi-
cation that is part of what is transmitted to the members of an internal group 
through education (Schutz 1979: 119). Although both concepts refer to dis-
tinct problems, we can affirm that relevance and typification are elements of 
the same system, whose role is precisely to “naturalize” or harmonize social 
life. According to Nasu (2008: 92), relevance is the most important problem 
for the phenomenological investigation of life-world, since it implies asking 
for the ways individuals experience objects and events around them, which 
means how they perceive, recognize, interpret, know and act in everyday life 
through the selection of facts in each situation. The experience itself occurs 
as a process of choice and not as a fatality or as a passive reception of data 
and information, due to the fact that individuals choose which elements of 
meaning should receive their attention, that is, which elements among those 
involved in a situation are made relevant. In this sense, the investigation of the 
motives for an action plays a key role.
The Schutzian sociology presents an explicit pragmatic component, since 
the individual is considered from the point of view of action, or of the immi-
nent action. Individuals are neither adrift nor submerged under the stream 
of the facts they experience, since they are “equipped” with the instruments 
needed to orient them. These instruments are the relevance and the typifica-
tion system, which selects the knowledge on hand, that is relevant to their 
action (Nasu 2008: 91); thus, pure events or facts do not exist, but only inter-
preted facts and events.
Action and life-world
It should be clarified that Schutz assumes that the raw material for the action, not 
being a trivial one, is the “objectivities and events which are already found …” 
(Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 3), which represents a limit for the possibility 
of free action. This limitation is given, for instance, by the pre-existence of a 
natural language in a culture in which individuals are socialized or even by 
the acts and the results of actions of others. This conception gives the idea 
that individuals are not isolated objects, on the opposite, they are seen in 
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their horizons, which are submitted to the interpretation of the individuals 
themselves. This context is called by Schutz as the reality of the everyday life-
world, in which “man can engage himself and which he can change while he 
operates in it…” (Schutz and Luckmann 1973: 3). 
Life-world (Lebenswelt) is the pre-existing intersubjective world that an indi-
vidual “takes-for-granted” in a “natural attitude” (Schutz 2003: 182), recog-
nizing objective elements of life as laws and customs that can guide the indi-
vidual’s action, as well as the conditions for the action (for instance, the other’s 
intention and his or her own). A natural attitude in everyday life does not 
suspend the belief in the existence of elements from the environment; to the 
contrary, what is suspended is precisely the doubt concerning the existence of 
these things (Schutz; Luckmann 1973: 27), since all past experiences are lived 
in the present as if they were ordered, as knowledge or as expectation that 
something in the near future will occur exactly the same way it occurred in 
the past. However, everything that is taken for granted in the life-world is sur-
rounded by uncertainty (Schutz; Luckmann 1973: 9). Thus, a natural attitude 
occurs simultaneously to the interpretation conducted by individuals, mostly 
based on the stock of knowledge available to individuals and on their previ-
ous experiences and of others with whom they are directly or indirectly in 
contact (for instance, parents, teachers, teachers of teachers, etc.), that means, 
based on the knowledge on hand (Wissen vorhand), which serves as a “refer-
ence code” (Schutz 1979: 72) for the individual. In this sense, this knowledge 
system – as the result of the sedimentation of subjective experiences in the 
life-world (Schutz; Luckmann 1973: 123) – assumes for those individuals that 
recognize themselves as internal members of a group, community or move-
ment an aspect of coherence, clarity and consistency sufficient for all to have 
a reasonable chance to understand and to be understood (Schutz 1979: 81). 
This way, the assumption that the sociology of Schutz would emphasize a too 
individualist perspective, “disconnecting” the individual from his/her reality 
(the social context) is obviously at best a misreading of his writings. 
Schutz dedicated himself not only to argue for the action as an expression 
of freedom, even with its constraints and limitations, but he went further and 
proposed that the sociology should investigate the motivation for the actions. 
The comprehension of a social phenomenon would not be accurate, from a 
schutztian sociological perspective, without having as starting point the inter-
pretation of the interpretation of those with experience in the phenomenon un-
der investigation. Proceeding this way would avoid replacing the experience of 
the actors by the view of the scientific interpreter, since any sociological study 
would be possible by simply replicating the ordinary view of common sense. 
To investigate the motivation for an action is to consider the subjective 
meaning for the agent, since it is intrinsic to the idea of action, at least in a We-
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berian perspective, that when action is concerned the agent assign a meaning 
to his/her action and, at the same time, gives a direction to it, which should be 
understood by others as meaningful. However, Weber was not very accurate 
in explaining how sociologists should proceed to access the actor’s subjective 
perspective and reach the construction of meanings. Schutz proposes that 
the subjective meaning of individual actors could be approached through the 
knowledge accumulated in direct and indirect experiences. Experience is not 
restricted to the practical events in which the individuals were personally in-
volved, but also events in which their contemporaries or even their predeces-
sors were involved, transmitted in some way (Schutz 2004: 69). It is exactly 
the knowledge acquired through experiences that will organize the different 
levels of relevance mobilized by individuals in all situation of everyday life. At 
the same time, the constitution of the meaning process could be accessed by 
the social scientific observer through the knowledge of the motivation of indi-
vidual actors (Dreher 2011: 493). Here, we see how Schutz developed the soci-
ology inaugurated by Weber when the Austrian sociologist proposed the dis-
tinction between “in-order-to motives” and “because motives” (Schutz 2004: 
110). While the in-order-to motives refer to the actor’s future expectation, the 
because motives concerns the past experiences and convictions anchored in 
the environmental and socio-historical circumstances in which the actor was 
involved (Dreher 2011: 493; see also Barber 2004).
The distinction between these two kinds of motivations offers a theoretical 
key to understanding the complex process of individual decision-making and 
action. By considering the temporality, the scientific observer obtains access to 
different aspects involved in the action, especially the past experience and the 
future expectation. The time aspect is probably only rarely incorporated as a 
clear criterion for defining a guide of action and is maintained implicit, even 
though time is a constitutively part of meaning (Muzzetto 2006: 5) as will be 
see next. In this sense, sociology is about making things explicit, through the-
oretical considerations and arguments or through empirical evidences, even 
if individual actors are not aware of all these aspects involved in their action. 
Even after decades of these contributions from Schutz to sociological the-
ory, we still see a marginal interest of social researchers for this temporal as-
pect. Here, again, most sociologists – when and if they put the question about 
the reason for having done something at all – are not very much convinced 
that the answer or at least a significant part of it can be found in the agents 
themselves. Even after the emergence of many sophisticated approaches in 
sociology, the most influential ones are still very loyal to the precursors of the 
discipline that tends to refer the question to an external, collective sphere, as 
classes, hierarchies, culture, social inequalities, gender, race, etc. It could be 
mentioned several recent examples of researches that do not consider both 
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the subjective component of the agents and at the same time the distinct time 
lived by the individual actors as a key issue for the comprehension of a social 
phenomena.
A balance of the literature on social movements, for instance, shows that 
these analyses grant a privilege to approach this phenomenon almost exclu-
sively from a systemic perspective. Paradoxically, an analytical dimension 
that is left aside by many in approaching social movements concerns the com-
prehension of the everyday life-world of those engaged in such movements. 
To know how a movement acts and the meaning of social movements for 
contemporary societies is not the same as to know how the members of this 
movement act, and the meaning of the movement for them. Knowing how the 
participants of a movement act means to know their motivation and their in-
terpretation of the movement itself, which means to understand the subjective 
meaning they conferred to the movement, considering the time perspective in 
this interpretation. To offer an analysis on social movements based on the sub-
ject’s perspective could open new possibilities to understand current societies. 
Actually, this is possibly the only way to conduct an investigation that could 
deserve the label of sociology, since the natural sciences as well as the positiv-
ist-oriented social sciences doesn’t assign a relevant role to the experience of 
individuals to understand the social reality. The same is valid for any other so-
cial phenomena, such as migration, the practice of violence, unemployment, 
for instance, since an “insider’s” perspective is the only way to get access to 
the experiences of those that are intrinsic part of any social phenomena. Even 
if this aspect is made clear in the writings of Schutz, a persistent critic on this 
theoretical perspective is that it doesn’t sufficiently consider the social context 
or the social structure. This kind of criticism assumes that the elements of a 
social structure are made valid without the active intervention of individuals, 
as if it could be considered as “something” external to those living in a specific 
time and place. In a schutzian perspective we could state, on the opposite, that 
there is no social context without the meaning assigned by individual actors, 
or at least its existence is sociologically irrelevant without the consideration of 
the subjective meaning, since no social context is socially inanimate.
Indeed, sociologists who dedicated to investigate and discuss social action 
are not totally inattentive regarding the motivation aspect of action when 
they discuss or ask for the reason of an action. However, not considering 
the temporality significantly constraints the observers to be satisfied with a 
partial answer to the individual’s reasons for the action. When dealing with 
the problem of the reasons for action, social scientists are usually much more 
concerned with the future expectations of the agent, there is to say, with the 
in-order-to motives. There is no doubt about the value of this topic for any 
sociological investigation. What is, then, the conflict pointed out by sociolo-
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gists when dealing with the concept of the “because motives”? One problem 
might be the fact that sociologists are permanently afraid to be considered 
as been performing a kind of psychology. Another conflict might be the fact 
that questioning about the “because motives” implies two kinds of difficulties: 
a philosophical and a methodological problem. The philosophical question 
refers to the issue discussed at the beginning of the text, i.e., the scope of re-
sponsibility from individual actors for their own actions, which is of difficult 
solution since it implies convictions already encrusted in the life trajectories of 
the researchers and is only hardly changed. To argue about the “because mo-
tives” would lead to admit a reasonable spectrum of individual responsibility. 
The methodological difficulty concerns the sociological access to the socio-
historical context of the individual actor. In many different passages Schutz 
indicates that the biography of individual actors is what should be considered 
in order to obtain any knowledge about the past experiences, especially in 
the articles The Problem of Relevance (Schutz 2004: 69), Choosing Among Projects of 
Action (Schutz 2004: 251) and The Biographical Situation (Schutz 2004: 208). It 
should not be forgotten that any biography is located in time and space and 
cannot be understood without taking into consideration its historical back-
ground (Schutz 2004: 209). This warning is just to remember that there are 
some relevant aspects of the structure and genesis of biographies that are sin-
gular and specific for an individual, but others that are shared by those living 
in the same socio-historical period. For an accurate comprehension of social 
and historical phenomena, it is important to incorporate the biographical 
component in the sociological investigation. 
Biography and the motivation for action
Biographical situations play a particularly important role in the definition of 
individuals’ relevance system. Of course, part of one’s biographical experi-
ence is determined not by the individuals themselves, for instance the lan-
guage in which he/she was socialized and which is considered as his/her 
“mother tongue”, or the legal system in all locations the person may visit or 
live, or even the different means of transportation used in these places. In 
these cases, individual actors have to deal with imposed relevances (Schutz 
2004: 92). However, how the mother language will be in fact used, or the in-
terpretation and the relation to the legal interdictions or even the evaluation 
of the transport used are not defined in absentia of the users themselves. These 
experiences can be considered as unique, even though it can be shared with 
others, it cannot be shared with all individual actors. Biographical experi-
ences are an integral part of all future situations, but it doesn’t mean that all 
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these experiences will be maintained intact in memory or even that the mean-
ing of these past experiences will be preserved. The opposite is what might be 
the case, due to the fact that new experiences play an important role when the 
individual is mentally reviewing what occurred in the past. In this sense, even 
the past is slippery and may occupy another place and role in the present and 
in the future; in short: past experiences are constantly reinterpreted and the 
result of this process is that, to understand as much as possible the action of 
individual actors or of a group of individuals that share some experiences in 
common, their biographical experiences must be considered. Even though the 
intention of accessing these kind of register of the memory is not to necessarily 
obtain the facts as they occurred in the past, the importance of this methodo-
logical approach is ratter to gain perspective from a primary source (those 
that experienced events under investigation), their interpretation of their own 
experience, that should not be crystallized as the most reliable report of the 
past. It doesn’t matter if the discourse about the actor’s own past corresponds 
to concrete facts; important is that it will be confronted to reliable narratives 
that correspond to the interpretation of those that narrate. 
Even referring to a subjective interpretation, the sociology of Schutz cannot 
be accused of not giving the adequate attention to individuals’ socio-historical 
experience. Unlike the most influential contemporary sociological theories, 
especially the new versions of critical theory and the post-structuralism ap-
proaches, the social and historical experiences, as well as the social context 
with its constraints, are incorporated and should be incorporated in any so-
ciological (empirical) inquiry following the writings of Schutz. Biographical 
experiences are the key component to track the motivations for any action, 
due to the fact that motivational relevance is made out of sediments of previ-
ous experiences, which were relevant for the person (Schutz 2004: 115). Not 
all experiences can be considered meaningful, only the already lived experi-
ences when viewed in retrospective (Muzzetto 2006: 10). To say that experi-
ences are meaningful implies that it is possible for individuals to distinguish 
and accentuate them, which means to confront them with other experiences 
when it is not possible to manage current experiences (see Muzzetto 2006). 
This can only be undertaken if the experience can be delimited through what 
Schutz calls “an attention act”. So, to assign meaning to an experience is to 
interpret it ex post through the recovering of the memory. 
Although Schutz did not delineate instruments and guides for empiri-
cal research based on his phenomenological-oriented sociology (Hitzler and 
Eberle 2000: 117), this can be undertaken through biographical narratives, 
since the approach makes it possible to recover the most important elements 
for the subjective interpretation, i.e. the system of relevance and the typifica-
tion process.
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Biographical and everyday life narrative approach, although very influen-
tial in European sociology, especially in the German scenario, mostly based 
on the sociology of Fritz Schütze (1983), is still unknown in many national 
sociological communities. The biographical narrative approach is capable of-
fering a very important access to the narrator’s interpretation, but also to the 
connections between individuals and their groups, communities and move-
ments (Carvalho 2003: 293) in a specific period of time. Nonetheless, it must 
be considered that any narrative is an interpretation viewed from a specific 
biographical situation, since a biography is a description of processes and 
lived experiences by the individual him/herself. In this sense, biography is 
someone’s “subjective interpretation of their own life trajectory” (Born 2001: 
245). To approach a problem this way implies a research concerned not only 
with the narrator – since his/her interpretation on life-world is what will be 
analyzed – but also with the researcher perspective, who plays simultaneously 
the role of the interpreter and a partner in the construction of a narrative. In-
dividuals whose narratives are the object of analysis are guided by their own 
relevance system. Here, the analysis of everyday verbal language (vocabulary 
and syntax) permits the access to the comprehension of the relevance and typ-
ification system, since “everyday life is, above all, life with language” (Berger 
and Luckmann 1991: 51).
Fritz Schütze is the leading German sociologist from a group of research-
ers that in the 1980s at the University of Bielefeld proposed the approach 
known as “biographical narrative”; the main contributions were a) to propose 
an specific way to conduct open interviews in a way that the relevance system 
could be expressed without the systematic intervention of the relevance sys-
tem of the researcher as usual in most qualitative research using interviews, 
and b) to introduce in the sociological analysis the distinction between dif-
ferent kinds of discourses that appear during an interview, i.e., arguments, 
description and narrative itself (Schütze 1983). This distinction comes from 
the socio-linguistic and is essential for the sociological approach based on the 
experience of actors having as starting point their own narrative, since it is the 
discursive resource more strictly connected to the chain of actions (Rosenthal 
2004: 53; Labov and Waletzky 1973), i.e., it is the kind of discourse most 
related to the way the narrator presents his/her interpretation of the develop-
ment of facts (Küsters 2009: 25).   
According to Gabriele Rosenthal, whose writings brought enormous con-
tributions to the biographical narrative approach, especially in the process of 
analysis by distinguishing the life history and narrated life story (see Rosenthal 
1995 and 2004), the comprehension of individual action requires investigat-
ing the actor’s subjective perspective as well as the course of his/her action. 
That means to investigate experiences considering the meaning that individu-
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al gave to their action by the time it occurred and the biographical context 
in which the narrators place their experiences (Rosenthal 2004: 49). In this 
sense, the resource of biographical narrative can be assumed as a possibility 
of combining a diachronic (the biography) with a synchronic approach (the 
interpreted biography from a biographically specific moment: the present). 
Regarding the past is in some way an interruption of the flux of durée, 
when the biographer makes his/her acts objects of reflection (see Muzzetto 
2006: 10). In this sense, dealing with one’s own biography is a systematically 
way to define provinces of meaning, which are delineated as past experiences. 
As Muzzetto remembers quite well, “past experiences are not stored in this 
‘stock’ at random. Nor are they isolated experiences. Experiences are, on the 
contrary, interconnected through manifold types of relationships…” (Muz-
zetto 2006: 16). However, all these connections are not always explicit for 
those who are systematically presenting their own past experiences. In part, 
the act of speaking of events that occurred in the past is already a constitution 
of meaning, but a great part of it can only be accessed through the explicit 
reconstruction of these experiences by a scientific observer, a sociologist for 
instance.  
With the analytical distinction introduced by Rosenthal in the biographi-
cal narrative approach just mentioned – between the experienced life history 
and what the “biographer” narrates about it (or the life story) – it is possible 
to make explicit in the biographical flow important elements for the compre-
hension of different kinds of social actions in a specific historical period and 
in a specific social context. The starting point is conducting the interview in 
a way to avoid what we could call a “colonization of the biographer” with 
the relevance system of the researcher. Of course, in any interaction there 
is a pre-given exchange of perspectives, but the process of invasion can be 
minimized as much as possible. The way found and used by biographical 
narrative researchers – trying to maintain loyal to the epistemological prin-
ciples of the Schutz sociology – is to conduct the interview without been 
anchored to the research interest. It means, defined that the person could 
potentially provide reports from his/her own experience of a phenomenon 
under investigation, that it doesn’t matter which subject is being explored (for 
example, migration, violence, unemployment, etc.), the task of the researcher 
is to stimulate the interviewees to tell their all life, in as many details as pos-
sible (for more information on how to conduct biographical narrative inter-
views, see, Rosenthal 1995; 2004; 2008). Proceeding this way it will be more 
feasible that the interviewee will expose spontaneously elements of his/her 
thematic field. 
The thematic field, as postulated by Gurwitsch (see Rosenthal, 2008), is the 
main structure of someone’s biographical presentation, even if the interviewee 
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is not very much aware of it. An important contribution of Rosenthal to the 
comprehension of individual’s life-world is to “decant” the large volume of in-
formation obtained during a biographical interview through several analyti-
cal steps. In this process, the already mentioned distinction between the possi-
ble discourses used in a life’s presentation – especially arguments, description 
and narrative – plays a central role. An advantage of this kind of distinction 
is that these discourse modalities may allow the access to the variation of tem-
poralities in the biographical presentation. For instance, arguing can indicate 
the interest of the biographer to justify in the present an idea or a past action 
when facing the researcher or an interlocutor in general. On the other hand, 
Schütze and the socio-linguistics prefer to call narrative the kind of discourse 
that register the action on the move that occurred in the past, doesn’t matter 
when in the past occurred the reported action, important is that it is possible 
to the interlocutor to follow the sequentiallity of an event through acts of the 
biographer him/herself or of any other person. Having these elements avail-
able for analytical means for the social researcher, to deal with important 
elements of the interviewee’s subjective interpretation of the life-world. The 
analysis follows the principle of abduction. Unlike the inductive proceeding, 
the empirical material collected, in this case, biographical narrations, does 
not aim to verify hypothesis formulated in advance, nor sustains hypothesis 
originated from a theory, as in the deductive approach. According to the ab-
ductive approach, proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce and largely adopted in 
biographical narratives researches, as well as by the so-called Grounded Theory, 
by Glaser and Strauss, the empirical material guides the formulation and 
tests of hypothesis able to make the case under investigation understandable 
(Rosenthal 2008: 58). Proceeding this way makes it possible to uncover the 
complexity of social phenomena by bringing new knowledge provided from 
the reality itself. 
If Schutz brought to the social theory the pathways of how to under-
stand the everyday life-world, the German sociologists, especially Schütze 
and Rosenthal, provided a feasible approach on how the social researcher 
could have access to it. The combination of the Schutz theory of life-world 
and the biographical narrative approach (as proposed by Schütze and in-
cremented by Rosenthal) represents the enlargement of the horizons and 
possibilities of a sociology anchored in the writings of Alfred Schutz. Al-
though very well established, especially in the German social sciences com-
munity, and internationally recognized, posses the potential of refreshing 
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